Backup Content Access and Download #649

Merged
tobru merged 3 commits from backup-access into main 2026-09-01 06:25:04 +00:00
Owner

Adds the design doc for backup content access and download, the follow-up to the backup visibility work (#544): not "did a backup happen?" but "give me the bytes".

What the spec proposes

Direct bucket access. Users get raw access to their backup data with their own external tools (restic, barman-cloud, aws/rclone); the portal helps by revealing the per-instance bucket credentials (plus the restic repository password where applicable) and rendering ready-made command blocks.

Main design points

  • Reveal is gated by a new permission (staff or org admin), is a CSRF-protected POST, is audited, and notifies org owners on first reveal (staff reveals audited but no email). Non-admin members see an "ask an organization admin" note.
  • Credentials are read-write today; the danger warning covers deletion and tampering.
  • Rotation stays a documented support runbook for now; no self-service rotation.
  • Out of scope: unmanagedBucket instances, legacy StackGres PostgreSQL, Garage/generic bucket backends. Portal-mediated exports and in-portal browsing were considered and dismissed (recorded in the doc).
Adds the design doc for backup content access and download, the follow-up to the backup visibility work (#544): not "did a backup happen?" but "give me the bytes". ## What the spec proposes **Direct bucket access.** Users get raw access to their backup data with their own external tools (restic, barman-cloud, aws/rclone); the portal helps by revealing the per-instance bucket credentials (plus the restic repository password where applicable) and rendering ready-made command blocks. ## Main design points - Reveal is gated by a new permission (staff or org admin), is a CSRF-protected POST, **is audited**, and **notifies org owners on first reveal** (staff reveals audited but no email). Non-admin members see an "ask an organization admin" note. - Credentials are read-write today; the danger warning covers deletion *and* tampering. - Rotation stays a documented support runbook for now; no self-service rotation. - Out of scope: `unmanagedBucket` instances, legacy StackGres PostgreSQL, Garage/generic bucket backends. Portal-mediated exports and in-portal browsing were considered and dismissed (recorded in the doc).
tobru changed title from WIP: Raw Backup Access to WIP: Backup Content Access and Download 2026-08-27 14:13:30 +00:00
tobru changed title from WIP: Backup Content Access and Download to Backup Content Access and Download 2026-08-31 13:07:52 +00:00
tobru force-pushed backup-access from 5ea151b97d
All checks were successful
Tests / test (push) Successful in 1m16s
to 632fedaef5 2026-09-01 06:23:28 +00:00
Compare
tobru merged commit 78509687d9 into main 2026-09-01 06:25:04 +00:00
tobru deleted branch backup-access 2026-09-01 06:25:04 +00:00
Sign in to join this conversation.
No description provided.